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I
INTRODUCTION
The world is now facing a global financial crisis that has put the whole
international system of payments at serious risk and will probably affect global
growth over the coming years. This situation has mobilized international
organizations, governments, central banks, and supervisory banking authorities
from all over the world, and many commentators have identified commonalities
between the current crisis and that of 1929. It is not necessary to go so far back,
however, to draw historical parallels: the Latin American debt crisis, initiated in
1982 with Mexico’s default, had similar characteristics. At that time, the nine
largest U.S. banks had exposures to countries with debt-servicing problems
equal to over two hundred percent of their primary capital,1 and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the situation as a crisis of the
international system of payments as a whole.2 That crisis prompted international
organizations like the IMF and the World Bank to grant specific facilities to
debtor countries, and national authorities to approve legislative responses like
the International Lending Supervision Act3 in the United States. Today the
problem also involves commercial banks’ assets, but this time the troubled
debtors are not governments or foreign agencies, but banks and private
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1. Manuel Monteagudo, The Debt Problem: The Baker Plan and the Brady Initiative: A Latin
American Perspective, 28 INT’L LAW. 59, 61 (1994) [hereinafter Monteagudo, The Debt Problem].
2. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE
FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 1989, at 23 (1989); see also Manuel Monteagudo, Reflexiones
Sobre la Crisis Financiera Internacional, 32 DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD 77 (2009); Monteagudo, The Debt
Problem, supra note 1.
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3912 (1983).
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customers. Domestic authorities are—as during the Latin American debt
crisis—taking some actions to reduce systemic spillovers, but with
unprecedented measures such as introducing guarantees for bank deposits
(unlimited in some cases, as in Ireland),4 temporarily nationalizing commercial
banks, and increasing deposit-insurance coverage. Central banks have also
developed unconventional measures, mainly reducing interest rates to near zero
percent and extending new liquidity instruments to banks. For example, the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board, in addition to reducing the Federal Funds Rate,
authorized the purchase of up to $100 billion in debt issued by the housingrelated, government-sponsored enterprises, and up to $500 billion in agencyguaranteed, mortgage-backed securities, as well as the creation of the TermAsset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.5
Today, as during the Latin American debt crisis, public powers are taking
the initiative to intervene exceptionally in markets in the name of the public
interest (that is, to protect the economy from systemic risk). In some countries,
like the United Kingdom, the financial packages launched by the government to
protect commercial banks from the impact of the international crisis were not
free from being suspected as noncompetitive measures that violated European
law.6 In October 2008, the European Commission issued a clarification to dispel
any doubt about the legality of government schemes that proliferated across
Europe. According to this communiqué, these actions could be understood as
aid “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” under
Article 87(3)(b) of the European Community Treaty.7
During the Latin American debt crisis, the international community sought
to strike a balance between global and individual interests. Debtor states took
the initiative to globally renegotiate the external debt of the whole public sector
(that is, central government, agencies, and state-owned companies), including,
in some cases, a portion of the external private debt with the support of
international organizations and creditor banks’ governments. These operations
implicitly replaced a variety of original loan agreements with a new global
restructuring agreement. However, a few creditors did not participate in the
global scheme and decided to initiate legal actions based on the original terms
of the agreements.8 Thus, national courts had to decide whether global packages

4. See infra note 6.
5. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Reflections on a Year of Crisis (Aug. 21, 2009), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090821a.htm.
6. See Tim Congdon, The Northern Rock Fiasco: How the EU has Damaged Britain’s Ability to
Govern Itself, THE EUR. J., Oct. 1, 2008, available at http://europeanjournal.typepad.com/my_weblog/
2008/10/the-northern-ro.html.
7. European Commission, Communication from the Commission—The Application of State Aid
Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context of the Current Global
Financial Crisis, OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION, Oct. 25, 2008, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:270:0008:0014:EN:PDF.
8. See infra Part II.B.
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modifying original loan agreements supported by creditor and debtor states
(and a substantial majority of commercial banks) should prevail over the
individual interests of “free riders.” This was the case when Elliott Associates
and Pravin Banker Associates brought Peru before U.S. courts.9 Initially, the
courts’ decisions appeared to favor global interests, but these were later
reversed.10 In fact, the IMF justified its Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM) proposal of 2001 in light of Elliott Associates v. Banco de
la Nacion, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
the original dismissal and granted a $56 million judgment in favor of Elliott,11
and the Brussels Court of Appeal authorized its execution through an order to
block any payment in favor of Brady-bond creditors.12 Former IMF Deputy
Managing Director Anne Krueger described the Elliot case as illustrating “a
missing element in the international community’s current approach to the roles
of the public and private sectors in debt restructuring.”13 It will be interesting to
compare the reaction of U.S. courts when they address the balance between
global and individual interests in the context of the current systemic financial
crisis in the United States.
In fact, Peru’s experience in sovereign debt management and litigation
offers a valuable insight for comparing domestic courts’ and creditors’ reactions.
Beginning in 1984, Peru was in permanent default for almost thirteen years. But
the most significant litigation experience began when Peru initiated
restructuring negotiations under the Brady Plan in 1996.14 Litigation during this
period was not promoted by original creditor banks, but by creditors like Elliott
and Pravin Banker that had acquired small pieces of Peruvian commercial debt
in the secondary market and were aimed at the full collection of the debt.15
During this period of default, Peru also required U.S. courts’ intervention to
clarify the nature and content of immunity for foreign central banks under the
U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA),16 when Riggs National Bank set
9. Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pravin Banker Assocs.
v. Banco Popular del Peru and Republic of Peru, 165 B.R. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 365 (2d Cir. 1999).
12. Elliott Assocs., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Ct. App. Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26,
2000).
13. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Address at the National
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner: International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/speeches/2001/112601.htm.
14. “By offering direct financial support for debt and debt service operations, the IMF and the
World Bank could provide new incentives, which would act simultaneously to strengthen prospects for
greater creditworthiness and to restore voluntary private financing in the future.” Nicholas F. Brady,
U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, Address Before a Conference on Third World Debt Sponsored by the
Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee: Dealing with the International Debt Crisis 4
(Mar. 10, 1989), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2146_v89/ai_7654675/.
15. Manuel Monteagudo, Comments About the Experience of Peru in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 23
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 293, 296 (2008) [hereinafter Monteagudo, Comments].
16. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891.
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off deposits belonging to the Central Bank of Peru (BCRP) to collect a claim
against the Peruvian government. That case, Banco Central de Reserva del Peru
v. Riggs National Bank of D.C.,17 raised the issue of whether banks could
execute such a self-help remedy against an independent central bank when the
law expressly prohibited prejudgment attachments. The parties reached a
settlement on appeal,18 but the conceptual inquiry remains open and deserves a
deeper analysis, considering the increase in worldwide central-bank investments
and the consolidation of their independence as a common practice.
The end of Peru’s debt problem illustrates in some way the accomplishment
of Nicholas Brady’s dream when the Plan was launched in 1989: the natural
return of sovereign debtors to international financial markets.19 Even though
Peru did not follow the calendar of the majority of debtor countries to negotiate
its debt (its Brady agreement was executed only in 1997),20 since 2001, it has
followed the general pattern with great success. Peru has begun to exchange
Brady bonds—Peruvian bonds collateralized by U.S. Treasury bills—for new
global bonds based on Peru’s own credit risk, and, since 2002, new long-term
bond issuances have been placed in international markets.21
This article, based on previous research and publications, broadly addresses,
from a global perspective, some of the major issues that arose in the course of
Peru’s litigation—reluctance to sue, balance of interests, pari passu claims, and
central-bank immunities. It then offers a reflection about the future of
sovereign debt management and the role of international law.
II
RELEVANT ISSUES FROM PERU’S EXPERIENCE IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
LITIGATION
A. Reluctance to Sue
Most syndicated-loan agreements signed by Peru’s central government,
agencies, and state-owned companies with commercial banks were governed by
foreign laws and submitted to Peruvian courts and to foreign jurisdictions such
as New York and London as is the usual practice in the international banking
industry. Peru’s default, as in most cases, was based on specific domestic
legislation mandating that national debtors not pay the external debt and
instead place the corresponding amount of capital and interest in special

17. See generally Banco Central de Reserva del Peru v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of D.C., 919 F. Supp. 13
(D.D.C. 1994).
18. JORGE PESCHIERA CASSINELLI, EL PLAN BRADY PERUANO: OPERACIONES DE REDUCCIÓN
DE DEUDA EXTERNA 1993–1997, at 86 (2002).
19. See supra note 14.
20. PESCHIERA, supra note 18, at 58.
21. See Emisiones Internacionales [International Emissions] 2002–2009, MINISTERIO DE
ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS [MEF], http://www.mef.gob.pe/DNEP/tabla_bonos_globales.php (last visited
July 10, 2010).
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accounts of public banking entities.22 This domestic legalization of defaults was
the reverse of the principle that the creation of public debt should be authorized
by law (that is, through the congressional power to authorize taxes and public
debt).23 A mandate to not pay the public debt must be authorized by law
because, as opposed to a simple commercial failure, the act of defaulting has
been characterized as a public power’s intervention to prevent the execution of
a commercial obligation. In the United States, the Act of State Doctrine
authorizes U.S. courts to abstain in circumstances in which they would have to
assess the validity of sovereign acts performed in their own territory.24
Conversely, this judicial doctrine does not apply to obligations that should be
executed in the United States, as in the case of syndicated loans payable in the
United States. That is, the situs requirement of the Act of State Doctrine
renders it inapplicable to sovereign debt defaults,25 something that was not
definitively clarified until the debt crisis of the mid-1980s.26
In any case, Peru’s commercial-bank creditors had sufficient support to
pursue legal actions in the United States during the long period in which Peru
remained in default (1984 through 1997). Yet creditor banks did not follow this
option. In March 1990, when the terms of many syndicated-loan contracts were
about to expire under New York law, creditor banks initiated thirty-four actions
in five different jurisdictions (New York, London, Toronto, Paris, and
Luxembourg).27 However, the suits were suspended by agreement four months
later because the banks were expecting to avoid only the prescription of their
claims, and not necessarily the full collection of extended credit or even the
attachment of Peru’s assets. In November, the Peruvian government issued a
Tolling Declaration that permitted creditor banks to dismiss their actions.28 The
22. In the case of Peru, legislation began with the Decreto Supremo No. 079-83-EFC and was
amplified by subsequent legislation: Decreto Supremo Nos. 100 and 198-83-EFC and Decreto
Legislativo 368. See Roberto Mac Lean, Legal Aspects of the External Debt, in 214 RECUEIL DES
COUR: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 91 (1989).
23. Like many national constitutions, the Peruvian Constitution accords to Congress the power to
create taxes and public debt. The default decrees were initially approved by the executive using
exceptional constitutional powers. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU.
24. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (explaining that under the Act
of State Doctrine, U.S. courts will not question the validity of the public acts of foreign sovereigns
within their own territory).
25. It has been recognized that:
In cases involving the ‘location’ of debts, most courts, like Bancomer [Braka v. Bancomer, 762
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985)], have concluded that the debt is located at the situs for its repayment.
Under this analysis, the act of state doctrine is applicable to the repudiation of debts that must
be repaid within the foreign state, but not to debts payable only at other locations.
GARY BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS
545–46 (1989) (citing Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985)).
26. Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53
EMORY L.J. 869, 913–14 (2004). “[F]or a drafter of a Eurodollar loan agreement in 1970, these judicial
decisions were fourteen years in the future.” Id. at 914.
27. PESCHIERA, supra note 18, at 23–24.
28. Monteagudo, Comments, supra note 15, at 296.
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major litigation Peru confronted came, rather, from assignee creditors (not
original creditor banks), just when it had begun to negotiate a restructuring
agreement with a large majority of commercial banks.
In fact, creditor banks were subject to capital-adequacy requirements, and
being highly exposed to less-developed countries’ (LDC) debts, they were
reluctant to initiate legal actions that would have forced them to classify their
LDC credits as nonperforming loans. As a general trend from 1982 to 1987,
banks tried to keep their LDC loans as current as possible in order to record
them at their original value, thus gaining time for increasing general reserves
and capital.29 For creditors that had purchased sovereign debt in the secondary
market, the approach would be completely different:
In some circumstances, a distressed debt purchaser’s objective of maximizing value
can work to the advantage of the sovereign debtor: a creditor that has purchased a
claim on the secondary market at a deep discount may be far more willing to agree to
a reduction in the face value of the claim than a creditor who purchased the claim at
face value. However, such creditors may also choose not to participate in a
restructuring that has been agreed upon by most creditors, with a view towards
30
extracting more favorable terms from the borrower.

In the case of Peru, assignee creditors (Elliott Associates or Pravin Banker)
rejected any possibility to participate in a restructuring agreement.
But a question that remains for history is why in the case of a debtor country
like Peru, which had remained in default for more than thirteen years (an
exceptional case among LDC debtors), original creditor banks did not opt to
sue when they had probably written off the loans from their balance sheets and
consolidated their capital position. One way to address this question is to recall
the general attitude of commercial banks during the debt crisis, which was
oriented mainly toward a negotiated solution for the reasons mentioned above,
and the proposals from governments—like the Baker31 and Brady Plans—and
international organizations. At least up to the end of the past century, the debt
problem was resolved out of court, and it is possible that the case of Peru
reflected banks’ inertial reluctance to sue.
B. The Global Versus the Individual Approach of U.S. Courts
The negotiated solution of Peru’s debt problem, both through multi-year
restructuring agreements signed by LDC debtors and commercial banks since

29. Id. at 302; see also A.F. Lowenfeld, Foreword, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485, 489 (1985);
Monteagudo, The Debt Problem, supra note 1, at 62.
30. Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L.
299, 319 (2005).
31. The Baker Plan proposed approaching the international debt problem by promoting sustained
growth in less developed countries (LDCs) through the application of sound economic policies, the
central participation of the International Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks, and the
increase of commercial bank financing to LDCs. See James Baker III, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury,
Address Before the Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF and the World Bank (Oct. 8, 1985), reprinted in
FROEIGN DEBTS IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 291–301 (Detlev
Dicke ed., 1986); see also Monteagudo, The Debt Problem, supra note 1, at 59.
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the beginning of the crisis and through the Brady exchange arrangements since
1989, consisted of global procedures intended to affect all creditors. In the
absence of international or multilateral mechanisms, such as the IMF’s SDRM,
those packages became, in practice, the only way to organize a process of
sovereign debt “bankruptcy.” Individual legal actions forced U.S. courts to
confront the dilemma of recognizing original rights of insignificant creditors
(under original terms of contracts) against the global renegotiating package
supported by the U.S. government.
Initial U.S. courts’ decisions in Elliott and Pravin favored global interest and
negotiation. They accorded temporary stays of summary judgments against
Peru32 and denied requests to seize Peru’s assets in the United States,33 when the
Brady agreement was still being negotiated and Peru was reinserting itself into
the international financial system with the support of foreign governments and
international organizations. For example, in justifying the stay of a summary
judgment in favor of Pravin, a U.S. district court reasoned, “To allow Pravin to
activate its claim in this case would be like letting the tail wag the proverbial
dog. . . . Peru is actively attempting to conform to mandates of the IMF[,] . . .
[which] may be construed to represent American policy interests.”34 In denying
an order to attach Peru’s quarterly interest payment to close the Exchange
Agreement under the Brady agreement, the court in Pravin also pointed out
that “restraining notices on these assets would inappropriately interfere with
Peru’s efforts to restructure its debts under the Brady Plan, and would unfairly
prejudice the rights of those of Peru’s creditors who have agreed to settle their
claims.”35 In Elliott, the court refused to order prejudgment attachment of
Peru’s assets, reasoning that the attachment would likely be “oppressive . . .
and . . . work irremediable hardship” upon Peru,36 and that Elliott may have
purchased the debt with the intent to sue, knowing of Peru’s “reasonable
resistance to settling outside the terms of the Brady [a]greement.”37
Yet the appellate courts’ final decisions took the opposite tack when the
global Brady agreement had concluded, preferring the protection of original
terms of loan agreements in the hands of insignificant creditors. When the
Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Pravin, it established
that preferring Peruvian debt negotiations would be contrary to the U.S. policy
of “ensuring the enforceability of valid debts under the principles of contract

32. Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru and Republic of Peru, 165 B.R. 379, 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
33. Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
34. Pravin, 165 B.R. at 387, 389.
35. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Application for Attachment, Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco
Popular del Peru and Republic of Peru (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1996).
36. Elliott, 948 F. Supp. at 1214.
37. Id. at 1209.
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law.”38 The same reasoning was followed in Elliott to reverse the earlier decision
to deny recovery to Elliott:
[T]he United States has a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts
under the principles of contract law, and in particular, the continuing enforceability of
foreign debts owed to United States lenders. This second interest limits the first so that,
although the United States advocates negotiations to effect debt reduction and
continued lending to defaulting foreign sovereigns, it maintains that creditor
39
participation in such negotiations should be on a strictly voluntary basis.

C. Pari Passu Provisions
Once Elliott obtained a final decision against Peru, it sought injunctive relief
in several foreign jurisdictions to prevent Peru from making an interest
payment to holders of the Brady bonds unless a proportionate payment was
made to Elliott based on the pari passu provision contained in the original
syndicated-loan contracts.
The guaranty extended in May 1983 by the Republic of Peru through a
letter agreement in favor of Banco de la Nacion and Banco Popular del Peru (as
original public-sector debtors) provided that “the obligations of the Guarantor
hereunder do rank and will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment with
all other External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon.”40
Elliott filed an ex parte motion before the Commercial Court of Brussels,
Belgium, to enjoin Morgan, the operator of Euroclear, for reasons of absolute
necessity, to instruct its cash correspondents not to have any amounts credited
to their accounts that originate from the Republic of Peru or Banco de la
Nacion, including amounts designed to pay interest under the Brady bonds.
And in case such funds had already been received, Morgan was to instruct the
cash correspondents to block those funds and to take no action that would
result in the funds being distributed in any manner within the Euroclear
system.41
Initially, Elliott’s motion was denied because the court considered that the
tests of “absolute necessity” and “extreme urgency” had not been fully met.42
But in September 2000, Elliott obtained an enforceable decision from the
Brussels Court of Appeal requiring Euroclear to block any cash payments from

38. Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 855 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
Robert S. Rendell, Collection of Sovereign Debt, INT’L FIN. L. REV., June 1997, at 52, 52 (“[T]he Second
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Pravin’s claim should be recognized notwithstanding
international comity considerations.”).
39. Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 379–80 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pravin, 109
F.3d at 855) (emphasis added).
40. See Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld at 8 (Aug. 31, 2000), filed in Elliott Assocs.,
L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, No. 96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14169 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2000) (on file with author).
41. Elliott Assocs., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Ct. App. Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26,
2000).
42. Id.
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Peru associated with its Brady arrangement.43 Under the pari passu provision,
the court wrote that Peru could not pay Brady-bonds holders to the detriment
of other creditors who should rank equally and, therefore, share pro rata in the
Brady-bonds proceeds.44
The Brussels Court of Appeal’s decision and its implications for the pari
passu clause have been widely examined within the academic community.
Lopez Sandoval suggests that, in formal terms, we should not overreact to the
consequences of that decision at the level of jurisprudence or doctrinal
development. According to Belgian law, any decision made pursuant to an ex
parte petition “is not related to the legal validity of any right alleged by the
petitioner, but only to the formal admissibility of the petition.”45 Peru’s
experience with the court’s reading of the pari passu clause, however, has
produced an interesting discussion about its interpretation. For Professor
Lowenfeld, the clause entitles each lender to share equally and ratably with any
other holder of external debt,46 so if Peru pays interest to holders of the Brady
bonds, it is obligated to pay a proportionate amount to any other holder of
Peruvian debt covered by a pari passu clause (like Elliott). On the other hand,
Professors Mitu Gulati and Kenneth Klee propose that, in the context of
corporate debt, the clause implies that “no other lender will enjoy a priority in a
liquidation distribution of the borrower’s assets.”47 Lee Buchheit and Jeremiah
Pam think that, if brought to extreme situations, Elliott’s ratable-payment
theory would make it impossible to make a full payment to anybody once a pari
passu debt (“this bond shall rank pari passu in priority of payment with all of
the borrower’s other debts”) is in default:
[E]qually-ranking debts must be paid equally—that’s the theory. By the debtor[‘s]
openly announcing its agreement (in a registration statement filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, for example) to maintain the equal ranking of
this bond with other debts, have those other creditors been given the power to enjoin
a payment under this bond, regardless of whether the instruments evidencing those
other debts contain their own pari passu covenants? And if there is even the remotest
possibility of this outcome, why would the purchasers of such a bond agree up front to
decline to accept payments under their instrument unless every other equally-ranking
lender to that borrower was also being paid in full? Analyzed in this way, a pari passu
48
covenant is a positively dangerous clause to include in any debt instrument.

For Professor Roberto Mac Lean, the purpose of this clause is to ensure that
the borrower treats all creditors holding the same category of debt equally and
to prevent earmarking of government revenues for the benefit of only some

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Eduardo Luis Lopez Sandoval, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Should We Be Worried About
Elliott? 16 (May 2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/education/
sp44.pdf.
46. Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, supra note 40, at 7.
47. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 639 (2001).
48. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 26, at 886.
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creditors. Moreover, he believes the pari passu clause is not related to the
timing of repayments because different loans can be repaid at different times.49
In the context of sovereign debt management and the debt crises,
experience shows that even with pari passu clauses in force, many creditors
enjoyed preferred status as part of a common practice in both domestic and
international law without any particular reaction from remaining creditors. In
studying the emergence of a transnational law on external debt, Professor
Dominique Carreau identified as privileged creditors (those who will keep the
original terms of their loans) the obligatory creditors, the short-term
commercial creditors, and the international public creditors (the IMF, the
World Bank, and regional banks such as the Inter-American Development
Bank).50 Elliott’s interpretation of the pari passu clause would make impossible
the continuity of financial operations of a debtor breaching a contract (with a
universal effect like the cross-default effects of ISDA (International Swaps and
Derivatives Association) transactions), and would render unnecessary the mere
existence of bankruptcy-law principles. According to those principles, under a
debtor’s petition, the State prohibits any individual creditor’s recovery outside
of an orderly and proportional payment to all creditors.51
Nicaragua was confronted with a situation similar to Elliott before Brussels
courts, but with different results. There, the Brussels Court of Appeal rejected
an injunction to prevent Euroclear from processing payments to certain bonds,
reasoning that measures were all directed at Euroclear as operator of a
securities system, which led to accord loan-contract stipulations (the pari passu
clause) with binding effects on a third party (Euroclear)—all contrary to the
basic principles of Belgian civil law.52 As a result, a new law was passed in
November 2004 to include incoming cash transfers that are to be credited
ultimately to cash-settlement accounts via a Belgian or a foreign bank as
formally protected against blocking measures.53

49. Mac Lean, supra note 22, at 58–59. In the same perspective as Mac Lean, Buchheit and Pam
ask, “As the lawgiving authority in its own country, what would stop a sovereign from passing a law
that, for example, purported legally to subordinate all of its existing foreign lenders in favor of some
new set of creditors . . . ?” Buchheit & Pam, supra note 26, at 913.
50. DOMINIQUE CARREAU, LA DETTE EXTERIEURE [THE EXTERNAL DEBT] 18 (Dominique
Carreau & Malcolm Shaw eds., 1995).
51. Ed Bartholomew, Angela Liuzzi & Ernest Stern, Two-Step Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Market-Based Approach in a World Without International Bankruptcy Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 859, 862
(2004).
52. Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Investments and Euroclear Bank S.A., General Docket No.
2003/KR1334 (Ct. App. Brussels, 9th Chamber, Mar. 19, 2004); see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 26,
at 882.
53. See Loi modifiant la loi du . . . 28 avril 1999 visant à transposer la Directive 98/26/CE du 19 mai
1998 concernant le caractère definitive du règlemtn dans les systems de paiement et de règlement des
opérations sur titres [Law Amending the Law of April 28, 1999 to Transpose the Directive 98/26/EC of
May 19, 1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment Systems and Settlement of Securities Transactions] of
Nov. 19, 2004, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 28, 2004, 85854, 85855
(amending Loi visant à transposer la Directive 98/26/CE du 19 mai 1998 concernant le caractère
definitive du règlemtn dans les systems de paiement et de règlement des opérations sur titres [Act to
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D. Setoff and Central Bank Immunities
The risk of attachment of a debtor country’s assets in the context of a
general default with creditor banks constitutes one of its major concerns. This
concern is even more dramatic for debtor countries’ central banks when they
have to keep and invest their last international reserves within the borders of
the international financial system. Special immunity should be accorded to the
central bank to avoid confusion by U.S. courts between sovereign obligations
and central-bank assets. The FSIA is silent, though, about the confusion that
could be activated by a commercial bank that plays the dual role of creditor
bank of the government and recipient of a deposit made by an independent
central bank.54 This was the issue discussed in the context of the action initiated
by the BCRP (the Central Bank of Peru) against Riggs National Bank of
Washington, D.C.55
The BCRP claimed that, because it was not an obligor of Riggs’s credit,
Riggs was unable to compensate its assets: there was an absence of mutuality as
the minimum premise to compensate.56 Additionally, the FSIA’s immunity from
attachment and execution should imply the interdiction to setoff in some cases,
as suggested by a 1993 U.S. district court case pointing out that prejudgment
attachment is a “disruptive” provisional remedy obtained through ex parte
application.57 In fact, these characteristics are even more evident in a setoff,
which is an extrajudicial, self-help remedy executed without any notice or
procedural safeguards.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Riggs denied the
motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the central bank (as supposed
the guarantor) could not disassociate itself from the Republic of Peru: “[T]his
would work injustice on Riggs.”58 Attachment and execution are fundamentally
different from setoff: “The former are legal remedies to legal wrongs, whereas
the latter is a remedy that rests in equity.”59 After the appeal (with the support
of an amicus curiae of some central banks), the parties settled the case. The
question remains open, though, as to whether banks can do by themselves what
is prohibited to courts by permitting the extension of governments’
responsibilities to independent central banks.60

Implement Directive 98/26/EC of May 19, 1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment Systems and
Settlement of Securities Transactions] of Apr. 28, 1999, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], Jan. 6, 1999, 19563, 19567).
54. Monteagudo, Comments, supra note 15, at 306.
55. Banco Central de Reserva del Peru v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of D.C., 919 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1994).
56. See id. at 16.
57. Weston Compagnie de Finance et D’Investissement, S.A. v. La Republica del Ecuador, 823 F.
Supp. 1106, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
58. Riggs, 919 F. Supp. at 16.
59. Id. at 17.
60. Monteagudo, Comments, supra note 15, at 309.
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III
PROSPECTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT ISSUES
History shows that public powers have always demanded financial resources
from private markets. Italian banks have financed many sovereigns since the
fifteenth century for different projects.61 The debt of Charles V’s empire with
private bankers increased from one million ducats in 1539 to more than six
million ducats, despite the revenues from the colonies.62 Wars were another
reason for government indebtedness or the assumption of financial obligations.
In the nineteenth century, most of the new Latin American republics initiated a
long restructuring of their external debt.63 European nations have not been
exempted from defaults and unilateral moratoria. France defaulted eight times
between 1500 and 1800, while Spain defaulted thirteen times between 1500 and
1900.64 Today, we see both developing and industrialized countries placing
sovereign bonds in domestic and international financial markets. Additionally,
modern central banks execute monetary policy through “repo” transactions
with Treasury bonds, and in the European Monetary Union, national central
banks are authorized to accept public securities from any EU member.65 In the
United States, treasury bills were instrumental in creating the largest public
debt in U.S. history.
During the current global financial crisis, many governments have assumed
a significant proportion of banks’ liabilities. In this context, it is correct to
conclude that the state’s role as debtor of private markets is still alive and that
new episodes of sovereign debt default cannot be ruled out. With a larger public
debt in the hands of more creditors across the world, some of the legal issues
addressed during the debt crises of the 1980s could reappear, this time in a
much more complex scenario. How to we deal with all the interests involved?
Should sovereign debt problems be resolved by private markets through
negotiated solutions or through soft-law enforcement and harmonization? Is it
realistic to envisage a role for international law?

61. See Henri Hauser, Réflexions Sur L'Histoire des Banques à L' Époque Moderne, 1 ANNALES
D'HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE, 335, 338 (1929).
62. PIERRE VILAR, HISTOIRE DE L’ESPAGNE 32 (2001).
63. Roberto Mac Lean describes this history thus:
Even since Latin American countries became independent from Spain or Portugal in the 19th
century, many of them had to pay for their wars of independence by borrowing from foreign
lenders. In 1822, one year after it took office, the first Government of Peru had to borrow £1.2
million sterling to pay for munitions, salaries and bonuses for the troops . . . . In 1848, during
the era of guano prosperity, new loans were received for the construction of railroads,
irrigation projects and restructuring of the previous debt.
Mac Lean, supra note 22, at 45.
64. Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff & Miguel Savastano, Debt Intolerance 12 tbl.2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9908, 2003).
65. See Press Release, European Central Bank, The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three:
General Documentation on ECSB Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures 48–49 (Sept. 16, 1998),
available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/gendoc98en.pdf.
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The answers to these questions cannot be conclusive and could be affected
by the wishful thinking of international-law practitioners. Just before World
War II, the League of Nations proposed an International Tribunal for Debts
that never materialized, even though this type of mechanism was subsequently
used in specific cases like the German Reparations Treaty of 1953.66 Almost fifty
years later, in 2003, more than seventy percent of member states supported the
IMF’s SDRM proposal.67 But some industrial countries and financial markets
strongly opposed it.68 For the United States, the SDRM’s provisions
would still interfere with the contractual claims of U.S. investors. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the [Dispute Resolution Forum], although limited, would supersede
that of the U.S. courts during the restructuring process. . . . Opposition to the SDRM
proposal by financial industry associations was, of course, also an important reason
why a number of emerging-market countries also opposed the SDRM proposal. The
private sector consistently warned that the SDRM, if adopted, would adversely affect
69
the volume and price of capital to these countries.

Still, the SDRM proposal did create a positive reaction from the markets,
which responded with the acceptance of collective-action clauses (CACs) in
new contracts to facilitate future restructurings in the era of bonds and avoid
the emergence of free riders like Elliott and Pravin Banker.70
If we look for international-law principles that address sovereign debt
issues, the answer will not be conclusive, either. In old cases, a force majeure or
state-of-emergency justification does not cover economic problems that might
be anticipated in any credit risk assessment. The Permanent Court of
International Justice has stated that a mere increase in the debtor’s burden,
although unanticipated at the agreement’s inception, would not excuse the
debtor’s nonperformance.71 But if we do not find international-law principles in
the classical sense, at least some practice could become a sort of lex mercatoria
in future customary international law. This is not mere wishful thinking,
considering the rapid evolution of foreign-investment international law.
Whereas fifty years ago, Latin American countries claimed exclusive domestic
jurisdiction for the treatment of foreign investment,72 today most of these

66. CARREAU, supra note 50, at 23.
67. Bartholomew, Liuzzi & Stern, supra note 51, at 859–60.
68. Hagan, supra note 30, at 391.
69. Id. at 391–92.
70. “During 2002, investors began to view CACs more favorably, in preference to the SDRM
alternative. And in February 2003, just a few weeks before the IMFC meeting, Mexico came to the
market with a new bond that included CACs.” Bartholomew, Liuzzi & Stern, supra note 51, at 860.
71. “The economic dislocation caused by the Great War has not, in legal principle, released the
Brazilian Government from its obligations.” Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in
France, 1929 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 21, at 120 (July 12, 1929); see also August Reinisch, Debt
Restructuring and State Responsibility Issues, in LA DETTE EXTÉRIEURE, supra note 50, at 537, 568–69
(1995).
72. Under the Carlos Calvo doctrine, many Latin Americans demanded during a large part of the
twentieth century that foreign investors be subject to national courts and domestic legislation. See
DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 428–30 (Pedone ed., 9th ed.
2007).
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countries have accepted the application of international law and the
international-arbitration jurisdiction under the ICSID (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) Treaty, bilateral-investment treaties, and
free-trade agreements.73
IV
CONCLUSION
Although international-law principles that address sovereign debt issues
may as yet be too inconclusive to guide the international system of payments
through the current global financial crisis, prior experiences such as the Latin
American debt crisis of the 1980s may provide guidance in terms of what to
expect or even of how domestic courts, governments, international
organizations, and banks may face some unresolved issues that derive from the
era of financial globalization. Peru’s sovereign debt litigation is an example of
this, showing some isolated hesitations by domestic courts to balance collective
and individual interest when deciding whether an individual’s claim, based on
the original terms of a loan agreement, should prevail over a global negotiation.

73. See Reinisch, supra note 71, at 582–84 (noting that internationalization clauses in contracts
between private investors and sovereign states provide an international-law standard in case of an
expropriation, a standard that may apply as a matter of customary international law).

